In Israel, you are allowed to win elections, but not to govern

In Israel of recent years, a dangerous and almost absurd distortion has taken shape: one camp is allowed to win elections, but it is not allowed to govern. It may win a majority. It may form a government. It may hear the president hand it the mandate. But the moment it tries to translate that victory into policy, the ritual begins: obstruction, suspicion, negative framing, and learned explanations for why the voters' will is really only a recommendation.

This is not ordinary substantive criticism of a government. Criticism is a healthy part of democracy. The problem begins when the very attempt to govern is presented as suspect. When nearly every move by an elected government is automatically labeled dangerous, extreme, anti-democratic, or harmful to the rule of law, the issue is no longer oversight. It is a method. A method that teaches the public one simple message: you may vote for whomever you want, as long as they do not actually change anything.

That is how the word "governance" became a slur. Instead of understanding that governance is a basic condition for a functioning democracy, Israel has gradually recast it as almost synonymous with abuse. Instead of seeing government as the body chosen to decide, lead, set priorities, and execute, some insist on treating it as a body permitted mainly to manage, explain, and wait for approval from power centers that never stood for public election.

This is where the distortion is exposed most clearly. Israel is not only arguing about policy. It is arguing about the right to govern itself. Is an elected government allowed to advance the agenda for which it was chosen, or is its role to collide again and again with walls of law, bureaucracy, media pressure, and organized civic power until it internalizes the message: you won the election, but the state is still not yours to run.

This is not only an institutional question. It is a cultural one. The framing is set in advance. When a government from the national camp asks for executive power, the language immediately turns to danger. When unelected systems exercise real power, the language suddenly becomes one of responsibility. When politicians seek to drive change, they are described as threatening the order. When gatekeepers, advisers, officials, or legal bodies expand their own reach, it is framed as necessary balance. That is how a reality is built in which only one side is repeatedly forced to justify its very desire to govern.

The result is a double erosion. Governance itself is worn down: elected governments struggle to carry out, advance, and decide. Public trust is worn down as well: if voters understand that even after a democratic decision the real power remains elsewhere, they absorb the lesson that the ballot box is not enough. And once the ballot box stops being enough, democracy itself begins to lose weight.

Governance is not a dirty word. It is not a malfunction. It is not a threat. It is the basic test of any functioning democratic order. Without the ability to govern, the voters' decision has no real meaning. Without the ability to implement policy, elections become symbolic theater. And without a willingness to recognize the legitimacy of majority rule even when it is inconvenient for certain power centers, democracy gradually turns into a system that allows choice but fears decision.

That is exactly where Israel stands. Not in a struggle between democracy and anti-democracy, but in a struggle between those who believe the public's verdict should be realized in the real world, and those willing to let it exist only as long as it remains limited, restrained, and dependent on outside approval. Anyone unwilling to see that is choosing to ignore not only political reality, but the long erosion of the very idea of elected government.

In the end, the question is simple: in Israel, are you only allowed to win elections, or are you also allowed to govern. As long as that question remains open, the problem is no longer about one government or another. It is a problem in the public order itself.